Wednesday, June 3, 2009

Analytical Psychology: Its Theory and Practice: Begun 2009.04.30

C.G. Jung.
Forward by E.A. Bennett.
New York: Vintage Books (Random House), 1970. Library of Congress Catalogue Card#67-19175.

Began April 30, 2009;
Finished Jun 21, 2009.


☆☆☆☆☆


This is a brilliant and provocative read! I finally found the source of the citation that Bernie Siegel used from Jung in his book Love, Medicine and Miracles, something I have wondered at for a long time.
...I have noticed that dreams are as simple or as complicated as the dreamer is himself, only they are always a little bit ahead of the dreamer's consciousness. I do not understand my own dreams any better than any of you, for they are always somewhat beyond my grasp and i have the same trouble with them as anyone who knows nothing about dream-interpretation. Knowledge is no advantage when it is a matter of one's own dreams (122).
As always, Jung is provocative.
He argues that a neurosis is a 'positive' thing, because it is the manifestation of the psyche's attempt at compensating/curing a life lived too one-sidedly.
And I suspect that this complex view, perhaps even wise view, of neurotic behaviour, is one of the reasons he is almost unheard of, and even dismissed, from most North American schools.
Anyway, see what you think in this post lecture Q&A:
Dr. Dicks ...Professor Jung, ... you regard the outbreak of a neurosis as an attempt at self-cure, as an attempt at compensation by bringing out the inferior function?

Prof. Jung: Absolutely.

Dr Dicks: I understand, then, that the outbreak of a neurotic illness, from the point of view of man's development, is something favourable?

Prof. Jung: That is so, and I am glad you bring up that idea. That is really my point of view. I am not altogether pessimistic about neurosis. In many cases we have to say: 'Thank heaven he could make up his mind to be neurotic'. Neurosis is really an attempt at self-cure, just as any physical disease is partly an attempt at self-cure. We cannot understand a disease as an ens per se any more, as something detached which not so long ago it was believed to be. Modern medicine — internal medicine, for instance — conceives of disease as a system composed of a harmful factor and a healing factor. It is exactly the same with neurosis. It is an attempt of the self-regulating psychic system to restore the balance, in no way different from the function of dreams — only rather more forceful and drastic (189-90).

Saturday, May 9, 2009

The Gift of Thanks: Begun 2009.05.22


Margaret Visser
ISBN: 978-0-00-200788-7

Began May 9, 2009.



[YtbF]
Stumbled into this book in the New Westminster Public Library's shelf of new acquisitions. I almost did not pick it up, because I have too many books
already on the go — as usual — and there is too much going on in my work and home lives. But her book
Much Depends on Dinner is one of the great examinations of contemporary society, and I have been remiss in reading her other books. It is looking great.

Did you know that saying 'Thank you' too often is taken as being insincere in some countries?
... until recently ... [social] researchers' underlying assumptions were that nothing exists but force, necessity, chance, and battles for advantage. It followed, of course, that genuine altruism could not exist. There is nothing, the wisdom went, to suggest human beings are in any respect superior to animals. We are a living species like any other, in no way better than, and merely different in certain respects from, say, birds or lizards.
However, many scientists seem at last to be awakening from a long, cold dream, a censored consciousness that insisted, among other things, that freedom was a mere hallucination. It is beginning to be acceptable again to notice that a gulf separates human cultures from those of other species, that a richness and even a uniqueness exists that should not be underestimated and remains to be accounted for. Merlin Donald points out how utterly different it is to remember having seen something, as apes do, and actively seek to retrieve a memory, as human beings do. Even in childhood, human beings go on not only to remember but to reflect on many events and to imagine others. They learn. They rehearse and deliberately refine their skills and responses. And this is to say nothing of speaking, reading, writing, calculating, inventing, theorizing — and rethinking inadequate theories....
Though it is indisputable that we gradually evolved through chance mutation and natural selection, Donald reminds us that when we began reading and writing a mere five thousand years ago, there can have been no genetic change involved: there simply was not enough time. What had involved instead — and with astounding and gathering speed — was culture. Now, the great difference between natural selection and culture is that where genetic variation is random, culture is systematic, and shot through with intentionality (33-34).

2009.05.18
I loved that Visser has managed to bring into the discussion a strong questioning of the validity of our accepted understandings of the history of the origins of economic activity. Society, perhaps even culture, existed long before economic activity did&mdashat least as we currently understand the idea 'economy.'
And I also am happy to see a strong swipe at the too easy acceptability of social darwinism. And that is what I am going to cite, now:
It was Marcel Mauss, the nephew of Emile Durkheim (one of the founders of sociology), who was responsible for formulating the question of Giving Back in such a manner that it became for most of the past century a problem for endless academic reflection and discussion. A new relevance has been discovered recently in his book, Essai sur le don (1925), retranslated into English as The Gift (1992), because Mauss seems to oppose aspects of Social Darwinism. For the notion walks again, "philosophically creaking but technically shining," as Mary Douglas puts it, that "the survival of the fittest" applies to human social life just as much as it does to the evolution of the species. Douglas feels that Mauss can help us make a counterattack upon the intellectual suppositions of Social Darwinism.
Marcel Mauss (1872-1950) lived at a moment of imminent change in Western social history, and he did not like what he saw coming. He was an anti-Utilitarian, who especially hated cold-hearted calculation of profit alone, and the privileging of individualism over social interaction. (His name is honoured today by the acronym of a French institute called M.A.U.S.S., Mouvement Anti-Utilitariste dans les Sciences Sociales.) As modern people often do when they want to solve their own social problems, he turned for help to what was known&mdashor thought to be known&mdashabout ancient societies and pre-modern societies. He felt that if only we could forget all our philosophizing and analyzing and categorizing, putting all things "back into the melting pot once more," we might achieve a state of wholeness and be happier for it.
Before Exchange [trade-for-profit and financial markets], says Mauss, was the Gift, and not vice versa. This was his first revolutionary proposition, which he derived from the anthropological fieldwork of others. Pre-modern peoples did not live by barter, as had previously been believed, but by gifts and counter-gifts. What in our culture would be commercial exchange was effected by these people through bringing gifts to others, who always gave gifts in return. Give and Return were not, as we imagine or wish them to be in our own culture, free and voluntary acts. Three obligations always obtained: Give, Receive, Reciprocate.
For a gift economy human beings later substituted exchange on the basis of contracts, which stipulated in advance what the price of a commodity would be. The invention of the externally valued, impersonal abstraction that is money made such contracts possible. [I would rephrase this to say that it was the desire to exchange the contracts themselves that would have motivated the formation of impersonal money.] And the contract was underwritten by law: if you did not pay for your commodities, you would be punished by an external agency in accordance with clear, impersonal laws. A gift economy, on the other hand, had no written contracts, no written laws. The gift system existed for a very long time before there was any writing. And it has nothing to do with money: it was flourishing well before money was invented. But always, in these systems, people who had received gifts gave gifts in return. What made them do so, if there were no laws to enforce reciprocity? [This reminds me of Jung's observation about our being barbaric and needing laws from without to enforce 'proper' social behaviour! Was money and contract law/language a devolution? Well, this could open an interesting philosophical argument, which I am going to skip for now, but which I will undoubtedly think about.]
Having shown that gift economies preceded contract systems, Mauss went on to universalize the rules he found in these 'societies of the Gift.' There is, he claims, not only in these societies but also in our own, no such thing as a free gift. There are, rather, three unspoken but mysteriously binding obligations: to give, to receive, and to reciprocate. And the most puzzling of these is the obligation to give back. For his astonishing explanation of the power that invariably underwrites this last obligation, Mauss relied upon a single Maori informant named Tamati Ranapiri, who was asked by the anthropologist Elsdon Best in 1909 to clarify for him the meaning of the Maori term hau. "I will speak to you about the hau," began Ranapiri, and proceeded to explain that it was "the spirit of the gift." It was that which caused utu, or reciprocity. If utu did not take place, then serious harm, even death, might come to the refractory person who had received a gift. The spirit of the object itself would take revenge.
People in societies like that of the Maori, said Mauss, did not distinguish, as we do, between givers and gifts. Things given away carried with them something of the self of the giver, and this piece of the giver's self demanded to be returned. Gifts always remained the possession, in some sense, of the giver....
Best's informant Ranapiri never claimed that the Maori hau actually uttered words, but the idea of anxious gifts complaining is found in other anthropological texts adduced by Mauss, where gifts have names, personalities, souls, histories, and desires. Copper objects given away in the American Northwest potlatches were said to 'groan' and 'grumble,' demanding to leave their present owners when they felt it was right to do so (71-73).
Sometimes Visser's writing nears poetry, a feature of writing I love when done well. I have emphasized her at her poetical best:

An essential characteristic of a good deal of gift-giving is its ritual dimension. We accompany the gift with quasi-ritual words spoken, gestures and manner, facial expressions. We communicate messages through the medium of gifts, and just as people speaking need not be aware of the grammar they are using, we follow the abstract rules of gift-giving even though we seldom analyze what they are. Language is explanatory as an object cannot be, but a present remains present as a sentence spoken cannot (114 my emphasis).
Wasn't that both interesting and beautifully written?

Friday, May 1, 2009

Dreams: Crucial Texts on the Meaning of Dreams: Begun 2009.04.27

C.G. Jung.
Dreams: Crucial Texts on the Meaning of Dreams by One of the Greatest Minds of our Time.
New York: MJF Books,
Two Lincoln Square
60 West 66th Street
New York, NY 10023.
ISBN: 1567311350.

Began April 27th, 2009

[YtbF]
Serendipitous find! Again, from Renaissance Books.

When I got it home and looked at it more closely, it looks like I have previously read all of these extracts from Jung's complete works.
But this is still a great find because I did not 'til now have all of them in my own library.
And, of course, re-reading Jung is always a good thing.

Curious that I seem to be on a bit of a Jung binge, right now.
Not sure why, but it is prompting me to attend my dreaming world. Again.

And, as always with Jung, lots of stuff to think about:
... understanding is not an exclusively intellectual process for, as experience shows, a man may be influenced, and indeed convinced in the most effective way, by innumerable things of which he has no intellectual understanding (p30; CW8 par468).
And:
... as to the classification of dreams, I would not put too high a value either on the practical or on the theoretical importance of this question. I investigate yearly some fifteen hundred to two thousand dreams, an on the basis of this experience I can assert that typical dreams do actually exist. But they are not very frequent, and from the final point of view they lose much of the importance which the causal standpoint attaches to them on account of the fixed significance of symbols. It seems to me that the typical motifs in dreams are of much greater importance since they permit a comparison with the motifs of mythology. Many of those mythological motifs . .. are also found in dreams, often with precisely the same significance. Though I cannot enter into this question more fully here, I would like to emphasize that the comparison of typical dream-motifs with those of mythology suggests the idea — already put forward by Nietzsche — that dream-thinking should be regarded as a phylogenetically older mode of thought....
Just as the body bears the traces of its phylogenetic development, so also does the human mind. Hence there is nothing surprising about the possibility that the figurative language of dreams is a survival from an archaic mode of thought.
...
Dreams, then, convey to us in figurative language — that is, in sensuous, concrete imagery — thoughts, judgments, views, directives, tendencies, which were unconscious either because of repression or though mere lack of realization. Precisely because they are contents of the unconscious, and the dream is a derivative of the unconscious processes, it contains a reflection of the unconscious contents. It is not a reflection of contents in general but only of certain contents, which are linked together associatively and are selected by the conscious situation of the moment. I regard this observation as a very important one in practice. If we want to interpret a dream correctly, we need a thorough knowledge of the conscious situation at that moment, because the dream contains its unconscious complement, that material which the conscious situation has constellated in the unconscious. Without this knowledge it is impossible to interpret a dream correctly, except by a lucky fluke ...(p33-35; CW8 par474-77).
And:
I believe it is true that all dreams are compensatory to the content of consciousness, but certainly not in all dreams is the compensatory function so clear as in this example. Though dreams contribute to the self-regulation of the psyche by automatically bringing up everything that is repressed or neglected or unknown, their compensatory significance is often not immediately apparent because we still have only a very incomplete knowledge of the nature and the needs of the human psyche. There are psychological compensations that seem to be very remote from the problem on hand. In these cases one must always remember that every man, in a sense, represents the whole of humanity and its history. What was possible in the history of mankind at large is also possible on a small scale in every individual. What mankind has needed may eventually be needed by the individual too. It is therefore not surprising that religious compensations play a great role in dreams. That this is increasingly so in our time is a natural consequence of the prevailing materialism of our outlook (p36; CW8 par483).
This paragraph has at least two very provocative,
to me, thoughts.
First:
The idea that the religious nature of compensatory dreams is because of materialism has a correspondence in that that compensation is also being made manifest in the non-dream world through the ideological 'dream' world of religious fundamentalism. While this is not proof of Jung's argument, of course, it is curious that there has been a huge growth in religious fundamentalism at much the same rate as the ideology of material consumerism has grown globally.

Second:
Jung's comment that what is possible for the history of mankind is to a smaller scale possible for the individual is an incredibly bold statement because there can be no empirical proof of this!
This does not mean I believe this is untrue, because I haven't thought of this in the manner presented here. I have chosen to not dismiss this thought, though, simply because of a failure of empirical proof because such a failure is not a proof of something's nonexistence. But I need to think about this.

Monday, April 13, 2009

Who Knows?: A Study of Religious Consciousness: Begun 2009.04.12

Raymond M. Smullyan
601 North Morton Street
Bloomington, Indiana 47404-3797 USA
2003.

Began, today, with an 'accidental' on-line find while researching Tachibana Akemi on the web.


[YtbF]
This find is an example of what I have called a 'synchronicity-petite'. Not powerful enough to be a full bodied synchronicity, but so weirdly wonderful I feel compelled to note them. How did this example come to be? Well, it began with my innocent choice to acknowledge the source of the image I have substituted for my mug on this blog, which is clipped from a painting by Tachibana Akemi. (Sadly, I am no longer able to find it on-line.) Tachibana has also written one of my favourite all time poems, 'Solitary Pleasures.' During my search I was surprised at how few Google hits I got for the poem, but that one of the five or so included one of my all time favourite philosophical writers, Raymond M. Smullyan. And while that is a delightful surprise, even more delightful was his having cited it within an overview of Canadian psychologist and philosopher Richard M. Bucke's idea of Cosmic Consciousness, and American philosopher/p
oet Walt Whitman's equivalent ideas as expressed in Leaves of Grass. And so I began to read the book that someone has scanned on line. See it at Who Knows?: A Study of Religious Consciousness, which is honestly available from Indiana University Press. (So I have yet another book to purchase.) But the most amusing thing about this find was an observation Bucke made about Whitman's reading habits, because he describes exactly what I do when perusing books, and what just happened here! Smullyan begins by citing Tachibana:
It is a pleasure
When, in a book which by chance
I am perusing
I come on a character
Who is exactly like me.
(Tachibana Tr. Keen 1935, pp.174-75).

Then Smullyan continues:
Well, I also like to come across characters just like me, and so I was delighted to come across the following observation by Bucke about the reading habits of Walt Whitman:
Though he would sometimes not touch a book for a week, he generally spent a part (though not a large part) of each day in reading. Perhaps he would read on an average a couple of hours a day. He seldom read any book deliberately through, and there was no more (apparent) system about his reading than
anything else that he did; that is to say, there was no system about it at all. If he sat in the library an hour, he would have a half dozen volumes about him, on the table, on chairs and on the floor. He seemed to read a few pages here and a few pages there, and pass from place to place, from volume to volume, doubtless pursuing some clue or thread of his own. Sometimes (though very seldom) he would get sufficiently interested in a volume to read it all.
(Bucke 1956, p219) (p.123)
What makes this book even more intriguing, is that Bucke's idea of Cosmic Consciousness, that Smullyan explores, corresponds to CG Jung's ideas of the development of consciousness. See, for example, The Origins and History of Consciousness by Erich Neumann. Then, even more amusingly (to me), Smullyan very gently chastises Bucke for excluding a few historical figures from a list of those who exhibited Cosmic Consciousness, such as Havelock Ellis, when neither refer to Jung. The timing of this read corresponds beautifully with the lecture I'm currently
reading, "VII: The Development of Personality," from CW17 The Development of Personality.

And, I guess, I may have to post the great little poem
"Solitary Pleasures".
So, why not now?
Exactly. Here it is:


It is a pleasure

when, spreading out some paper,

I take brush in hand

And write far more skilfully

Than I could have expected.

It is a pleasure

When, after a hundred days

Of twisting my words

Without success, suddenly

A poem turns out nicely.

It is a pleasure

When, rising in the morning

I go outside and

Find that a flower has bloomed

That was not there yesterday.


It is a pleasure

When, a most infrequent treat,

We've fish for dinner

And my children cry with joy

"Yum-yum!" and gobble it down.


It is a pleasure

When, in a book which by chance

I am perusing,

I come on a character

Who is exactly like me.


It is a pleasure

When, without receiving help,

I can understand

The meaning of a volume

Reputed most difficult


It is a pleasure

When, in these days of delight

In all things foreign,

I come across a man who

Does not forget our Empire.


Tachibana Akemi (1812-68); tr. Donald Keene.

(Perhaps from Anthology of Japanese Literature.

New York: Grove Press, 1935.

Saturday, March 28, 2009

The Collected Essays, Journalism & Letters of George Orwell V2: Begun 2009.03.28

Penguin Books 1970. (No ISBN in my copy.)

Began March 28th, 2009




[YtbF]
I stumbled across this while looking for Spengler in a local used book store called Renaissance Books. This is a book I will be dipping into occasionally, with a finished-reading date far in the future, despite Orwell being one of my favourite authors.
This is a book I will pop into when I want a quick read.

I randomly flipped to 'The Meaning of a Poem.' The poem Orwell writes about is "Felix Randal" by Gerard Manley Hopkins.
FELIX RANDAL the farrier, O he is dead then? my duty all ended,
Who have watched his mould of man, big-boned and hardy-handsome
Pining, pining, till time when reason rambled in it and some
Fatal four disorders, fleshed there, all contended?

Sickness broke him. Impatient he cursed at first, but mended
Being anointed and all; though a heavenlier heart began some
Months earlier, since I had our sweet reprieve and ransom
Tendered to him. Ah well, God rest him all road ever he offended!

This seeing the sick endears them to us, us too it endears.
My tongue had taught thee comfort, touch had quenched thy tears,
Thy tears that touched my heart, child, Felix, poor Felix Randal;
How far from then forethought of, all thy more boisterous years,
When thou at the random grim forge, powerful amidst peers,
Didst fettle for the great grey drayhorse his bright and battering sandal!
(p157-8)



Sunday, March 1, 2009

The Development of Personality: CW of CG Jung Vol.17: Finished 2009.04.26

C.G. Jung
ISBN: 0691018383 / 9780691018386 / 0-691-01838-3

Began March 1, 2009

Finished April 26, 2009

☆☆☆☆☆

Filled with stimulating ideas.
(All citations published with permission of the publisher.)

For example:
If one studies the origins of modern empirical psychology one is profoundly impressed by the fight which the earliest investigators had to wage against the firmly entrenched scholastic way of thinking. Philosophic thought, powerfully influenced by theology ('queen of sciences'), had a decidedly deductive tendency, and over it there reigned a mass of naïve, idealistic preconceptions which were bound sooner or later to lead to a reaction. This reaction took the form of the materialism of the nineteenth century, from whose outlook we are not yet completely freed even today. The success of the empirical method is so undeniable that the splendour of its victory has even begotten a materialistic philosophy, which in reality is more a psychological reaction than a justifiable scientific theory. The materialistic outlook is an exaggerated reaction against the medieval idealism and has nothing to do with the empirical method as such (par. 127).
And:
Of the unconscious we can know nothing directly, but indirectly we can perceive the effects that come into consciousness. If everything in consciousness were, as it seems, subject to our will and choice, then we could not discover anywhere an objective criterion by which to test our self knowledge (par112).
And:
...No doubt theory is the best cloak for lack of experience and ignorance, but the consequences are depressing: bigotedness, superficiality, and scientific sectarianism (intro. p.7).
And:
... It sometimes happens that even important contents disappear from consciousness without the slightest trace of repression. They vanish automatically, to the great distress of the person concerned and not at all on account of some conscious interest which has engineered the loss and rejoices over it. I am not speaking here of normal forgetting, which is only a natural lowering of energy-tension; I am thinking rather of cases where a motive, a word, image, or person vanishes without a trace from the memory, to reappear later at some important juncture. ... For, in the last resort we are conditioned not only by the past, but by the future, which is sketched out in us long beforehand and gradually evolves out of us. This is especially the case with a creative person who does not at first see the wealth of possibilities within him, although they are all lying there ready. So it may easily happen that one of these still unconscious aptitudes is called awake by a 'chance' remark or by some other incident, without the conscious mind knowing exactly what has happened, or even that anything has awakened at all. Only after a comparatively long incubation period does the result hatch out. The initial cause or stimulus often remains permanently submerged. A content that is not yet conscious behaves exactly like an ordinary complex. It irradiates the conscious mind and causes the conscious contents associated with it either to become supercharged, os that they are retained in consciousness with remarkable tenacity, or else to do just the opposite, become liable to disappear suddenly, not through repression from above, but through attraction from below. One may even be led to the discovery of certain hitherto unconscious contents through the existence of what one might call 'lacunae,' or eclipses of consciousness. It is therefore well worth while to look a bit more closely when you have the vague feeling of having overlooked or forgotten something. Naturally, if you assume that the unconscious consists mainly of repressions, you cannot imagine any creative activity in the unconscious, and you logically arrive at the conclusion that eclipses are nothing but secondary effects following a repression. [Tom: again, an example of that logic follows from an assumption, regardless of the truth or appropriateness of that assumption.] You then find ourself on a steep slope. The explanation through repression is carried to inordinate lengths, and the creative element is completely disregarded. Causalism is exaggerated out of all proportion and the creation of culture is interpreted as a bogus substitute activity This view is not only splenetic, it also devalues whatever good there is in culture. It then looks as if culture were only a long-drawn sigh over the loss of paradise, with all its infantilism, barbarity, and primitiveness. In truly neurotic manner it is suggested that a wicked patriarch in the dim past forbade infantile delights on pain of castration. Thus, somewhat too drastically and with too little psychological tact, the castration myth becomes the aetiological culture-myth. This leads one to a specious explanation of our present cultural 'discontent,'* and one is perpetually smelling out regrets from some lost paradise which one ought to have had. That the sojourn in this barbarous little kindergarten is considerably more discontenting and uncomfortable than any culture up to 1933 is a fact, which the weary European has had ample opportunity to verify for himself during the last few years. I suspect that the 'discontent' has very personal motivations. Also, one can easily throw dust into one's own eyes with theories. The theory of repressed infantile sexual-practice to divert one's attention from the actual reasons for the neurosis, that is to say, from all the slacknesses, carelessnesses, callousnesses, greedinesses, spitefulnesses, and sundry other selfishnesses for whose explanation no complicated theories of sexual repression are needed. People should know that not only the neurotic, but everybody, naturally prefers (so long as he lacks insight) never to seek the causes of any inconvenience in himself, but to push them as far away from himself as possible in space and time. Otherwise he would run the risk of having to make a change for the better. Compared with this odious risk it seems infinitely more advantageous either to put the blame on to somebody else, or, if the fault lies undeniably with oneself, at least to assume that it somehow arose of its own accord in early infancy. One cannot of course quite remember how, but if one could remember, then the entire neurosis would vanish on the spot. The efforts to remember give the appearance of strenuous activity, and furthermore have the advantage of being a beautiful red herring. For which reason it may seem eminently desirable, from this point of view also, to continue to hunt the trauma as long as possible.

This far from unwelcome argument requires no revision of the existing attitude and no discussion of present-day problems. There can of course be no doubt that many neuroses begin in childhood traumatic experiences, and that nostalgic yearnings for the irresponsibilities of infancy are a daily temptation to certain patients. But it remains equally true that hysteria, for instance, is only too ready to manufacture traumatic experiences where these are lacking, so that the patient deceives both himself and the doctor. Moreover it still has to be explained why the same experience words traumatically with one child and not with another.

Naïveté is out of place in psychotherapy. The doctor, like the educator, must always keep his eyes open to the possibility of being consciously or unconsciously deceived, not merely by his patient, but above all by himself. The tendency to live in illusion and to believe in a fiction of oneself — in the good sense or in the bad — is almost insuperably great. The neurotic is one who falls victim to his own illusions. But anyone who is deceived, himself deceives. Everything can then serve the purposes of concealment and subterfuge. The psychotherapist should realize that so long as he believes in a theory and in a definite method he is likely to be fooled by certain cases, namely by those clever enough to select a safe hiding-place for themselves behind the trappings of the theory, and then to use the method so skillfully as to make the hiding-place undiscoverable (par 200-2).
*Cf. Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents,Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, XXI (1961; first pub. 1930).

The lecture "The Development of Personality"
is particularly powerful! I wonder if Jung was reacting to something, as there is a great deal of impatience, even anger, in his writing.
For example:
... Our age has been extravagantly praised as the "century of the child." This boundless expansion of the kindergarten amounts to forgetfulness of the problems of adult education divined by the genius Schiller. Nobody will deny or underestimate the importance of childhood; the severe and often life-long injuries caused by stupid upbringing at home or in school are too obvious, and the need for more reasonable pedagogic methods is far too urgent. But if this evil is to be attacked at the root, one must in all seriousness face the question of how such idiotic and bigoted methods of education ever came to be employed, and still are employed. Obviously, for the sole reason that there are half-baked educators who are not human beings at all, but walking personifications of method. Anyone who wants to educate must himself be educated. But the parrot-like book-learning and mechanical use of methods that is still practised today is no education either for the child or the educator (par 284)....
And:
The fact is that the high ideal of educating the personality is not for children: for what is usually meant by personality — a well-rounded psychic whole that is capable of resistance and abounding in energy — is an adult ideal. It is only in an age like ours, when the individual is unconscious of the problem of adult life, or — what is worse — when he consciously shirks them, that people could wish to foist this ideal on to childhood. I suspect our contemporary pedagogical and psychological enthusiasm for the child of dishonourable intentions: we talk about the child, but we should mean the child in the adult. For in every adult there lurks a child — an eternal child, something that is always becoming, is never completed, and calls for unceasing care, attention, and education. That is the part of the human personality which wants to develop and become whole. But the man of today is far indeed from this wholeness. Dimly suspecting his own deficiencies, he seizes upon child education and fervently devotes himself to child psychology, fondly supposing that something must have gone wrong in his own upbringing and childhood development that can be weeded out in the next generation. This intention is highly commendable, but comes to grief on the psychological fact that we cannot correct in a child a fault that we ourselves still commit. Children are not half as stupid as we imagine. They notice only too well what is genuine and what is not (par 286)....
At times Jung moves firmly into the realm of the poetical! (No wonder he is almost unknown in the empirically obsessed age we find ourselves living within.)
Our personality develops in the course of our life from germs that are hard or impossible to discern, and it is only our deeds that reveal who we are. We are like the sun, which nourishes the life of the earth and brings forth every kind of strange, wonderful, and evil thing; we are like the mothers who bear in their wombs untold happiness and suffering. At first we do not know what deeds or misdeeds, what destiny, what good and evil we have in us, and only the autumn can show what the spring has engendered, only in the evening will it be seen what the morning began (par 290).

He has interesting comments on 'Marriage as a Psychological Relationship':

So far as reason or calculation or the so-called loving care of the parents does not arrange the marriage, and the pristine instincts of the children are not vitiated by false education or the hidden influences of accumulated and neglected parental complexes, the marriage choice will normally follow the unconscious motivations of instinct. Unconsciousness results in non-differentiation, or unconscious identity. The practical consequence of this is that one person presupposes in the other a psychological structure similar to his own. Normal sex life, as a shared experience with apparently similar aims, further strengthens the feeling of unity and identity. This state is described as one of complete harmony, and is extolled as a great happiness ("one heart and one soul") — not without good reason, since the return to that original condition of unconscious oneness is like a return to childhood. Hence the childish gestures of all lovers. Even more is it a return to the mother's womb, into the teeming depths of an as yet unconscious creativity. it is, in truth, a genuine and incontestable experience of the Divine, where transcendent force obliterates and consumes everything individual; a real communion with life and the impersonal power of fate. The individual will for self-possession is broken: the woman becomes the mother, the man the father, and thus both are robbed of their freedom and made instruments of the life urge (par 330).