Saturday, July 16, 2011

2011.07.07 — Year 501: The Conquest Continues — begun 2011.06.23

Noam Chomsky.
Year 501: The Conquest Continues.
Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1993. ISBN 189543162X.

Year 501 book has begun exceptionally well, and so even before finishing it I give it
★★★★★ out of ☆☆☆☆☆.
My enthusiasm arises with my discovery that with Y501 Chomsky has very directly addressed the history of economics and its propagandized ideology versus its pragmatic 'reality.' Chomsky has actually looked at the real world economic and social consequences of our so-called democratizing economic practices. That examination includes the roles by which the economic prractices of the 'haves' are used as a club to open or keep open to exploitation the resources of the have-nots. Chomsky with great irony uses the accepted economic designations 'North' and 'South' that were used to delineate between these groups, with Russia and much of eastern Europe getting lumped in with the 'South'.

I am on page 103 and this is without doubt one of Chomsky's best works. I confess that I am likely biased towards it because of my interest in economic ideology and Y501 is ... I'm trying to find the right adjective. With Y501 Chomsky confirms with historical detail and the usual endless and invaluable references that my economic criticism is well founded. He is filling in and broadening the economic understanding and conclusions I have already come to and that I have been articulating far less effectively than him for many years. For example, see Death by Freezing: The Ideology of Economics that I wrote almost twenty years ago.

The book is chock-a-block full of interesting and well documented examples of just how delusional is the idea that 'free market' / capitalistic economies create social wealth with an invisible hand. As well as citing how free market economies have created poverty for the many and extreme wealth for the few, Chomsky also cites examples of economic success that have been the result of explicitly NOT following so-called IMF / free market rules. The most obvious being Japan.
Some have suggested — only half in jest — that Japan's support for the Brookings Institution and other advocates of standard [economic] doctrine is intended to reinforce belief in the classical theory, to the detriment of its commercial rivals3-3(101).
Note: I've included the footnotes from the text with live links to them. To see the footnoted references click on the footnote superscript. To return to where you were reading in the text click the 'back' button on your web browser. I have included, when available, links to the various references, publications, people, events, and organizations within the text and in the footnotes in order to make research a little easier.

And the timing of my beginning to read Y501 is very interesting because of the financial crisis in Greece. But then again, in the last 20 years when hasn't there been some kind of world jeopoardizing economic crisis demanding tax payer paid rescues?! But what is interesting is to read how effective has been the IMF's history of successfully fixing myriad broken economies since its inception in the late 1940s.

A quick look at the IMF's history affirms that the violent opposition by Greece's citizenry is well-founded, despite the media's consistent line that only with economic and social austerity is prosperity possible. And, despite its easily measured failures it would seem that with their economic clubs, perhaps abetted by the effectiveness of the propagandized 'free-market' economic ideology, Greece is preparing to fix their economy by essentially gutting and immolating the economy of the civilian population, with the net fix being to pad the accounts of the ruling elite.

As it turns out, and almost fushigi-like, Chomsky makes several very critical references to the real effects of IMF instituted and directed changes that have been foisted on various countries versus what they ideologically claim to do for them. (And it is affirming to read someone other than myself criticizing the IMF's effect, which I do vociferously and frequently with co-workers and just about anyone within ear shot. Having read Chomsky will allow me to relax from feeling like just another economic Cassandra!)

Now, for some Chomsky. From Chapter 2 The Contours of World Order
:
2.4. The End of the Affluent Alliance
...

The complaints of those who continue to maintain their iron control with little challenge are not without their comic aspects. For every 100 articles berating the left-fascists who control everything, there might be one responding weakly that the takeover is not so complete as claimed, and none telling the truth —which is obvious enough, if only from the distribution of views allowed to surface. But restricting thought is a serious matter, and respected figures do not crack a smile as they march in the parade, bewailing the fact that they may have lost some comparative literature department (perhaps to a right-wing "deconstructionist" or liberal "relativist" denounced as left-fascists).

To the totalitarian mentality, even the slightest deviation is an awesome tragedy, and evokes the most impressive frenzy. And the spectacle makes a useful contribution to entrenching further the ideological controls that prevent the rascal multitude from attending to what is happening around them.

2.5. The "Vile Maxim of the Masters"

The world economy has not returned to the growth rates of the Bretton Woods era. The decline of the South was particularly severe in Africa and Latin America, where it was accompanied by rampant state terror. It was accelerated by the neoliberal economic doctrines dictated by the world rulers. The UN Economic Commission for Africa found that countries pursuing the recommended IMF programs had lower growth rates than those that relied on the public sector for basic human needs. The disastrous impact of neoliberal policies in Latin America was particularly striking.2-34

On occasion, developed societies take their own rhetoric semi-seriously and fail to protect themselves from the destructive impact of unregulated markets. The consequences are much the same as in the traditional colonial domains, if not so lethal. Australia in the 1980s is a case in point. Free market experiments carried by the Labor government succeeded in reducing national income by over 5 percent a year by the end of the decade. Real wages declined, Australian enterprises fell under foreign control, and the country advanced towards the status of a resource base for the Japan-centered state capitalist region, which maintained its dynamic growth thanks to the radical departures from neoliberal dogma that had spurred development in the first place. In Britain after a decade ofThatcherism, "prospects remain bleak because of insufficient reinvestment in the physical UK economy," the director of a US investment firm observes, echoing a Japanese counterpart who says, "We think it will take a long time for the UK economy to recover."2-35

As noted, the rich industrial societies themselves are taking on something of a Third World cast, with islands of extreme wealth and privilege amidst a rising sea of poverty and despair. This is particularly true of the US and Britain, subjected to Reagan-Thatcher discipline. Continental Europe is not too far behind, despite the residual power of labor and the social contract it has defended, and Europe's ability to export its slums through the device of "guest workers." The collapse of the Soviet empire offers new means to establish the North-South divide more firmly within the rich societies. During the May 1992 strike of public workers in Germany, the chairman of Daimler-Benz warned that the corporation might respond to strikes by transferring manufacturing facilities for its Mercedes cars elsewhere, perhaps to Russia, with its ample supply of trained, educated, healthy and (it is hoped) docile workers. The chairman of General Motors can wield similar threats with regard to Mexico and other sectors of the Third World. And East Europe. While GM plans to close 21 plants in the US and Canada, it has opened a $690 million assembly plant in East Germany with great expectations, heightened by the fact that, thanks to 43 percent unofficial unemployment, workers are willing to "work longer hours than their pampered colleagues in western Germany" at 40 percent of the wage and with few benefits, the Financial Times reports. Capital can readily move; people cannot, or are not permitted to by those who applaud Adam Smith's doctrines when it suits their needs.

It is not that Daimler-Benz is greatly suffering from the labor costs that management deplores. Two weeks after issuing the threat to move Mercedes production to Russia, the same chief executive, Edzard Reuter, announced the "excellent result" of an exceptionally strong first-quarter performance for 1992, with a profit rise of 14 percent and a 17 percent increase in sales, largely abroad; German workers are not quite the intended market for the Mercedes division, the chief profit earner for this huge conglomerate, which will slash up to 10,000 jobs in 1992, Reuter added, with another 10,000 to follow. Such facts. however, do not impress the US press, where the news columns bitterly assailed striking German workers for their "soft life," long vacations, and general lack of understanding of their proper place as tools of production for the rich and powerful. They should learn the lessons taught to American workers by the Caterpillar corporation at the same time: profits and productivity up, wages down, the right to strike effectively eliminated by the free resort to scabs ("permanent replacement workers").2-36

These are the fruits of the fierce corporate campaign undertaken as soon as American workers finally won the right to organize in the mid 1930s, after long years of bitter struggle and violent repression unmatched in the industrial world. Perhaps we may even return to the days when the admired philanthropist could preach the virtues of 'honest, industrious, self-denying poverty' to the victims of the great depression of 1896, shortly after he had brutally crushed the steel workers union at Homestead, while announcing that the defeated workers had sent him a wire saying, 'Kind master, tell us what you wish us to do and we will do it for you." It was because he knew "how sweet and happy and pure the home of honest poverty is' that Carnegie sympathized with the rich, he explained, meanwhile sharing their grim fate in his lavishly appointed mansions.2-37.

So a well-ordered society should run, according to the 'vile maxim of the masters' (54-57).

And from Chapter 3 North-South/East-West:
3.3. Return to Normalcy
...

'Unexpected side effects' of the invisible hand have also been found in Russia, again eliciting much surprise. A front-page New York Times headline reads: 'The Russian's New Code: If It Pays, Anything Goes.' 'It is not just a matter of crime, corruption, prostitution, smuggling, and drugs and alcohol abuse,' all on the rise: 'There is also a widespread view that ... people are out for themselves and anything goes' — unlike the United States, where pursuit of the 'vile maxim of the masters' is unknown, or the Third World domains that have been subject to our helping hand. 'Swindles and bribes are hardly a new phenomenon in Russia,' correspondent Celesting Bohlen observes, and were familiar in the 'old Communist system' — again, unlike the US and its clients.

During the same days, the Times was reporting the saga of President Fernando Collor of Brazil, the fair-haired boy of Washington and the business community, who broke new records in corruption in a richly-endowed country that has been a 'testing area' for US experts for half a century (see chapter 7). One may recall a few domestic examples of corruption as well, from the days of the Founding Fathers, no slouches in this game, and on to the Reaganites and Wall Street in the 1980s. Corruption is an intrinsic feature of "the old Communist system," the ideological institutions (correctly) proclaim: [however] under "capitalist democracy," it is an aberration, quickly corrected.

The new "ostentatious wealth sets most citizens' nerves on edge," Bohlen continues, describing the standard consequences of neo-liberal remedies. "Crime has soared in Russia after the collapse of Communism, as it did in Eastern Europe," including white-collar crimes, which have "taken off." But "the levels of crime are still well below New York's standards." There is still room for progress towards the capitalist ideal.

The economies of Eastern Europe stagnated or declined through the eighties, but went into free fall as the IMF regimen was adopted with the end of the Cold War in 1989. By the fourth quarter of 1990, Bulgaria's I industrial output (which had previously remained steady) had dropped 17 percent, Hungary's 12 percent, Poland's over 23 percent, Romania's 301 percent. The UN Economic Commission for Europe reported in late 1991 that the region's output had declined 1 percent in 1989,10 percent in 1990, and 15 percent in 1991, predicting a farther decline of 20 percent for 1991, with the same or worse likely in 1992. One result has been a general disillusionment with the democratic opening, even some growing support for the former Communist parties. In Russia, the economic collapse has led to much suffering and deprivation, as well as "weariness, cynicism, and anger, directed at all politicians, from Yeltsin down," Brumberg reports, and particularly at the ex-Nomenklatura who, as predicted, are coming to be the typical Third World elite serving the interests of the foreign masters. In public opinion polls, half the respondents considered the August 1991 Putsch illegal, one-fourth approved, and the rest had no opinion.

Support for democratic forces is limited, not because of opposition to democracy, but because of what it becomes under Western rules. It will either have the very special meaning dictated by the needs of the rich men, or it will be the target of destabilization, subversion, strangulation, and violence until proper behavior is restored. Exceptions are rare.3-20

Loss of faith in democracy is of small concern in the West, though the "bureaucratic capitalism" that might be introduced by Communists-turned-yuppies is a potential problem. In the Western doctrinal system, democratic forms are meritorious as long as they do not challenge business control. But they are secondary: the real priority is integration into the global economy with the opportunities this provides for exploitation and plunder.

With IMF backing, the European Community (EC) has provided a clear test of good behavior for Eastern Europe. In the old days, the Russians had to prove that they were not "flirting with the thought" of supporting the aspirations of "the common man." Today, East Europe must demonstrate that "economic liberalization with a view to introducing market economies" is irreversible. There can be no attempts at a "Third Way" with unacceptable social democratic features, let alone more substantive steps towards democracy and freedom, such as workers' control. The chief economic adviser to the EC, Richard Portes, defined acceptable "regime change" not in terms of democratic forms, but as "a definitive exit from the socialist planned economy—and its irreversibility." One recent IMF report, Peter Gowan notes, "concentrates overwhelmingly on the Soviet Union's role as a producer of energy, raw materials, and agricultural products, giving very little scope for the republics of the former Soviet Union to play a major role as industrial powers in the world market." Transfer of ownership to employees, he notes, "has commanded strong popular support in both Poland and Czechoslovakia," but is unacceptable to the Western overseers, conflicting with the free market capitalism to which the South must be subjected.

The South, that is. Conforming to traditional practice, the EC has raised barriers to protect its own industry and agriculture, thereby closing off the export market that might enable the East bloc to reconstruct its economies. When Poland removed all import barriers, the EC refused to reciprocate, continuing to discriminate against half of Polish exports. The EC steel lobby called for "restructuring" of the East European industry in a way that would incorporate it within the Western industrial system; the European chemical industry warned that construction of free market economies in the former Soviet empire "must not be at the expense of the long-term viability of Western Europe's own chemical industry." And as noted, none of the state capitalist societies accept the principle of free movement of labor, a sine qua non of free market theory. Eastern Europe, or at least large parts of it, is to return to the Third World service role.3-21

The situation is reminiscent of Japan in the 1930s, or of the Reagan-Bush Caribbean Basin Initiative, which encourages open export-oriented economies in the region while keeping US protectionist barriers intact, undermining possible benefits of free trade for the targeted societies.3-22 The patterns are as pervasive as they are understandable.

The US has watched developments in Eastern Europe with some discomfort. Through the 1980s, it sought to impede East-West trade relations and the dissolution of the Soviet empire. In August 1991, George Bush advised Ukraine not to secede just before it proceeded to do so. One reason is that after Reagan's wild party for the rich, the US is not well-placed to join German-led Europe and Japan in taking advantage of the newly opened sectors of the South. Liberal Democrats urge that "foreign aid" be diverted from Central America to the USSR, warning that without the traditional export-promotion devices, the EC and Japan will exploit "the vast trade and investment potential of Eastern Europe" while "We debate how to clear up two foreign policy debacles" (Senator Patrick Leahy); no serious person would be so rude as to suggest that we might at least help wash away some of the rivers of blood we have spilled. In 1992, President Bush proposed his Freedom Support Act to remedy the problem. A "stream of high-ranking US officials and big-business leaders" lobbied for the measure, Amy Kaslow reports. Ambassador Robert Strauss urged rapid action "lest US firms lose out to competitors...in the huge consumer market of the former Soviet Union." The Act will provide "new opportunities" for US "farmers [agribusiness] and manufacturers," and "help pave the way for US corporations to explore vast new markets." There is no confusion about just whose "Freedom" is being "Supported."3-23

3.4. Some Free Market Successes

It would only be fair to add that the IMF-Worid Bank recipe now being imposed upon the former Soviet empire has its successes. Bolivia is a highly-touted triumph, its economy rescued from disaster by the 1985 New Economic Policy prescribed by the expert advisers now plying their craft in Eastern Europe. Public employment was sharply cut, the national mining company was sold off leading to massive unemployment of miners, real wages dropped, rural teachers quit in droves, regressive taxes were introduced, the economy shrank along with productive investment, while inequality increased. In the capital, Melvin Burke writes, "street vendors and beggars contrast with the fancy boutiques, posh hotels and Mercedes-Benzes." Real per capita GNP is three-fourths what it was in 1980, and foreign debt absorbs 30 percent of export earnings. As a reward for this economic miracle, the IMF, Interamerican Development Bank, and the G-7 Paris Club offered Bolivia extensive financial assistance, including secret payments to government ministers.

The miracle that is so admired is that prices stabilized and exports are booming. About two-thirds of export earnings are now derived from coca production and trade, Burke estimates. The drug money explains the stabilization of currency and price levels, he concludes. About 80 percent of the $3 billion in annual drug profits is spent and banked abroad, mainly in the US, providing a lift to the US economy as well. This profitable export business "obviously serves the interests of the new illegitimate bourgeoisie and the 'narco-generals' of Bolivia," Burke continues, and "also apparently serves the United States national interest, inasmuch as money laundering has not only been tolerated by the United States but has, in fact, been encouraged." It is "the poor peasant coca growers" who "struggle to survive against the combined armed might of the United States and the Bolivian military," Burke writes. There are always plenty more to ensure that the economic miracle will continue, eliciting much praise.

Confirming these figures, Waltrad Morales estimates that about 20 percent of the labor force depends for a livelihood on coca/cocaine production and trade, which amounts to about half of Bolivia's GDP. The export miracle has disrupted land prices and agricultural development, "and as a consequence Bolivians can no longer feed themselves." Malnutrition for children under 5 is over 50 percent higher than the (awful) regional average. A third of the country's food must be imported. "This 'national food crisis'—further aggravated by the neoliberal economic model—has contributed to the marginalisation of the peasantry, which has forced many of them to grow coca leaf in order to survive," in a downward cycler.3-24

On to Poland.

Achievements have also been recorded elsewhere, thanks to timely US intervention and expert management. Take Grenada. After its liberation in 1983—following several years of US economic warfare and intimidation that have been effectively barred from history—it became the largest per capita recipient of US aid (after Israel, a special case). The Reagan Administration proceeded to make it a "showcase for capitalism," the conventional formula as a country is rescued from its population and set on the right course by its benefactors; Guatemala in 1954 is another announced "showcase" that should be famous (see chapter 7.7). The reform programs, which brought the usual social and economic disaster, are condemned even by the private sector they were designed to benefit. Furthermore, "the invasion has had the long-term effect of neutering the island's political life," Carter Special Assistant Peter Bourne reports from Grenada where he is teaching at the Medical School whose students were "rescued": "No creative vision aimed at plans for solving Grenada's social and economic ills has emerged from the lackluster and pliantly pro-American leaders" as the island suffers from record levels of alcoholism and drug abuse, and "crippling social malaise," while much of the population can only "flee their beautiful country."

There is, however, one bright spot, Ron Suskind reports in a frontpage Wall Street Journal article headlined "Made Safe by Marines, Grenada Now is Haven for Onshore Banks." The economy may be "in terrible economic shape," as the head of a local investment firm and member of Parliament observes—thanks to USAID-run structural adjustment programs, the Journal fails to add. But the capital "has become the Casablanca of the Caribbean, a fast-growing haven for money laundering, tax evasion and assorted financial fraud," with 118 offshore banks, one for every 64 residents. Lawyers, accountants, and some businessmen are doing well; as, doubtless, are the foreign bankers, money launderers, and drug lords, safe from the clutches of the carefully crafted "drug war."3-25

The US liberation of Panama recorded a similar triumph. The poverty level has increased from 40 percent to 54 percent since the 1989 invasion. Guillermo Endara, sworn in as President at a US military base on the day of the invasion, would receive 2.4 percent of the vote if an election were held, according to 1992 polls. His government designated the second anniversary of the US invasion a "national day of reflection." Thousands of Panamanians "marked the day with a 'black march' through the streets of this capital to denounce the US invasion and the Endara economic policies," the French press agency reported. Marchers claimed that US troops had killed 3000 people and buried many corpses in mass graves or thrown them into the sea. The economy has not recovered from the battering it received from the US embargo and the invasion. A leader of the Civic Crusade, which led the middle-class opposition to Noriega, told Chicago Tribune reporter Nathaniel Sheppard that "Economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. against our will in 1987 to oust Noriega did nothing to hurt him but ruined our economy. Now we believe the sanctions may have been part of a plan to destroy our economy in such a way that we would not have strong ground to demand dignity and better treatment from the US." George Bush's June 1992 visit, which ended quickly in a well-publicized fiasco, "focused attention on long-simmering animosity toward Bush" for the invasion, Sheppard reported; the "rifle-toting American troops" in residential neighborhoods are a particular irritant, and the mood was not improved when security forces accompanied by "about eight American personnel" invaded the home of a National Assembly member, rifling through papers, taking passports, firing shots, and intimidating his wife, who was home alone, he alleged.

A post-invasion report on Panama presented to the UN Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by Mexican Ambassador Javier Wimer reports that the economy has collapsed, with "catastrophic effects in the areas of food, housing, and basic services such as health, education, and culture." Human rights violations are on the rise as a result of the invasion and subsequent efforts to "liquidate the vestiges of the former nationalism," with labor rights under particular attack along with any institutions that might be "nuclei of civic protest and political opposition." The governments of Panama and the US are jointly responsible for "serious and systematic" human rights violations, his report concluded. According to the respected Central America Report (Guatemala, CAR), the US drug war may be providing a cover for attacks on community activists by the security forces and other human rights abuses.

But some indicators are up. The General Accounting Office of Congress reported that drug trafficking "may have doubled" since the invasion while money laundering has "flourished," as was predicted at once by everyone who paid attention to the tiny European elite whom the US restored to their traditional rule. A study financed by USAID reported that narcotics use in Panama is the heaviest in Latin America, up by 400 percent since the invasion. The executive-secretary of the Center of Latin American Studies, which participated in the study, says that US troops "constitute a very lucrative market for drugs," contributing to the crisis. The increase is "unprecedented,... especially among the poor and the young," The Christian Science Monitor reports.3-26

Another triumph of free market democracy was recorded in Nicaragua, where the Chamorro government and US Ambassador Harry Shiaudeman signed accords opening the way for the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to operate there "in an attempt to control the growing drug trafficking problem," CAR reports. The DEA agent in Costa Rica declared that Nicaragua is now "being used as a corridor for transferring Colombian cocaine to the United States," and a Department of Justice prosecutor added that the Nicaraguan financial system is laundering drug money. There is also a growing drug epidemic within Nicaragua, fueled by the high level of drug use by recent returnees from Miami as well as the continued economic decline and the new avenues for drug trafficking since the US regained control. "Since the installation of the Chamorro government and the massive return of Nicaraguans from Miami," CAR reports, "drug consumption has increased substantially in a country long free from drug usage." Miskito leader Steadman Fagoth accused two members of the Chamorro cabinet, his former contra associate Brooklyn Rivera and the minister of fishing for the Atlantic Coast, of working for the Colombian cartels. The Nicaraguan delegate to the Ninth International Conference on the Control of Drug Trafficking in April 1991 alleged that Nicaragua "has now become a leading link in cocaine shipments to the US and Europe." In Managua, the number of street children is rapidly increasing, as is drug addiction, which had been virtually eliminated by 1984. Ten-year-old children sniff glue on the street, saying that "it takes away hunger."

In fairness, we should mention a sign of economic progress now that the US has regained control: marketing of shoe cement to fill the children's bottles, imported through a multinational supplier, has become a lucrative business.3-27

A conference attended by government officials and NGOs in Managua in August 1991 concluded that the country now has 250,000 addicts and is becoming an international bridge for drug transport, (in comparison 400,000 addicts are reported in Costa Rica, 450,000 in Guatemala, 500,000 in El Salvador). Addiction is increasing particularly among young people. A conference organizer commented that "In 1986 there wasn't one reported case of hard drugs consumption" while "in 1990, there were at least 12,000 cases." 118 drug dealing operations were identified in Managua alone, though it is the Atlantic Coast that has become the international transit point for hard drugs, leading to increased addiction. US journalist Nancy Nusser reports from Managua that cocaine has become "readily available only since president Violeta Chamorro took office in April 1990," according to dealers. "There wasn't any coke during the Sandinistas' time, just marijuana," one dealer said. Minister of Government Carios Hurtado said that "the phenomenon of cocaine trafficking existed before, but at a low level." Now it is burgeoning, primarily through the Atlantic Coast according to "a ranking Western diplomat with knowledge of drug trafficking" (probably from the US Embassy), who describes the Coast now as "a no man's land." In the Miami Herald, Tim Johnson reports that El Salvador too "is finding itself afflicted by a new scourge: drug trafficking." It is now outranked only by Panama and Guatemala as a corridor for cocaine shipments to the US.3-28

Drugs are becoming "the newest growth industry in Central America," CAR reports, as a result of the "severe economic conditions in which 85 percent of the Central American population live in poverty" and the lack of jobs, conditions exacerbated by the neoliberal onslaught. But the problem has not reached the level of Colombia, where security forces armed and trained by the US are continuing their rampage of terror, torture, and disappearances, targeting political opposition figures, community activists, trade union leaders, human rights workers, and the peasant communities generally while US aid "is furthering the corruption of the Colombian security forces and strengthening the alliance of blood between right-wing politicians, military officers and ruthless narcotics traffickers," according to human rights activist Jorge Gomez Lizarazo, a former judge. The situation in Peru is still worse3-29 (79-86).


Notes to pages 54-7 (Chapter 2 'Contours of World Order')

34. See below, ch. 7; Deterring Democracy, ch. 7. Nancy Wright, Multinational Monitor, April 1990, cited in Gar Alperovitz and Kai Bird, Diplomatic History, Spring 1992. See also James Petras, Monthly Review, May 1992.

35. Fitzgerald, Tom. Between Life and Economics. Foreign staff, "US and Japan shy from investing in UK," Financial Times, Sept. 25,1992.

36. Fisher, Marc. "Why Are German Workers Striking? To Preserve Their Soft Life," Washington Post service, International Herald Tribune, May 4; Andrew Fisher, Financial Times, May 20; Christopher Parkes, Financial Times; Kevin Done, Financial Times, Sept. 24 (GM); The Financial Times; June 4,1992. Elaine Bernard, "The Defeat at Caterpillar," ms. Harvard Trade Union Program, May 1992.

37. Sexton, Cayo Patricia. War on Labor and the Left, 83f. See ch. 11, below.

Notes to pages 79-86 (Chapter 3 'North-South/East-West')

3-3. Gerschenkron, Alexander. Econonomic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, 146, 150. Du Boff, Richard Accumuiation and Power, 176, citing [Simon] Kuznets.
...

3-20. Feffer, John. Shock Waves: Eastern Europe After the Revolution, 22, 112, 129. Brumberg, The New York Review of Books, Jan. 30; The Financial Times, Feb. 3; Robinson, The Financial Times, April 28, 1992. Haynes, European Business and Economic Development, Sept. 1992. Economic indicators; The Financial Times, Sept. 28,1992. Engelberg, The New York Times, Feb. 9; The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 4; Glaser, The New York Times, April 19; Bohlen, The New York Times, Aug. 30,1992. Continental Illinois, see p. 63. Children, see DD, ch. 7;' h. 9.5, below. Polanyi, Great Transformation.Miller, Founding Finaglers. On the Costa Rican exception and US attitudes towards it from the 1940s, see M, lllf., App. V.I; DD, 221f., 273ff.

3-21. Gowan, Peter. World Policy Journal, Winter 1991-92.

3-22. See Deere, Carmen Diana et al. In the Shadows, 213; McAfee, Kathy. Storm Signals: Structural Adjustment and Development Alternatives in the Caribbean.

3-23. See Deterring Democracy, chs. 1.6,3.3. Amy Kaslow, Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 12,1992.

3-24. Burke, Melvin. Current History, Feb. 1991; Morales, Waltrad, Third World Quarterly, vol. 13.2, 1992. See also Peter Andreas et al., "Dead-End Drug Wars," Foreign Policy, winter 1991-92.

3-25. McAfee, Kathy. Storm Signals: Structural Adjustment and Development Alternatives in the Caribbean, ch. 7. Bourne, Peter, Orlando Sentinel, April 12, 1992. Ron Suskind, The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 29,1991. Chomsky, Noam. Deterring Democracy, 162. On the suppressed history, see Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies>,177 f.

3-26. CAR (Central America Report), Sept. 27, 1991; June 5, 1992. Latinamerica press (Lima), June 4,1992. AFP, Chicago Sun-Times, Dec. 22, 1991. Sheppard, Chicago Tribune, June 18, May 22, Sept. 1, 1992. Proceso (Mexico), Dec. 2, 1992 (LANU)-Kenneth Sharpe, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 19,1991. Andreas, op. cit. Joachim Bamrud, The Christian Science Monitor. Jun. 24,1991.

3-27. CAR, Sept.20, Nov. 29, May 3,1991. Links (National Central America Health Rights Network), Summer 1992.

3-28. Felipe, Jaime. Inter Press Service, Subtext (Seattle), Sept. 3-l6; Nusser, AWnews service, Sept. 26; Tim Johnson, Miami Herald, Dec. 3,1991.

Interesting.

Wednesday, June 29, 2011

2011.06.28 — Beyond Fate by Margeret Visser — finished

Begun 2011.05.26.
Margaret Visser.
Beyond Fate,
Toronto: House of Anansi Press Inc.
ISBN 0887846793

☆☆☆☆☆ out of ☆☆☆☆☆.
Margaret Visser's premise is an excellent one, which is that we as citizens of a 'free' society are using that freedom to choose to revert back to being victimized by fate. We don't call it fate. Instead we have with encouragement from the media, economic experts and the like, chosen to call it 'globalization' or 'technoloighy' or 'meaninglessness.'

After having so thoroughly enjoyed Visser's Much Depends On Dinner, I confess to having been a little disappointed with the first lecture. I wrestled with what I didn't like, and I tentatively think that I found that her style of oral presentation had not translated well to the written word. A bit too repetitive, and a few too many returns to the opening theme.

But her ideas, and the philosophical and linguistic associations and cultural meaning she discusses are genuinely interesting. For example, Visser examines how the Greek (and hence Roman) thinking was rooted in fate via the ideals of honour/shame, place/revenge, and how that zeitgeist imprisons the citizenry in a status quo concomitantly with endless cycles of honour saving revenge. (See Begun 2011.05.26 for a look at Greek fatalism.)

Visser articulates the idea with the image of a line contrasted against the closed line (circle). By the end of the book she has tied the idea very well to present practices and habits of thought.

An example of one of these interesting and important points she makes in the first lecture is the role that Christian beliefs founded in Judaism had in breaking the trap of the shame/revenge cycle:

An important aspect of the Christian revolution was a new resolve to break out of the ancient Greek and Roman view that human beings are in thrall to fate. Christianity's roots in Judaism provided it with a perennially powerful story about hope and freedom: that of the Exodus, or Way Out. The picture is of a journey of a people out of bondage to liberation. The journey took time, forty years — the number forty being a Jewish symbol for enough time, "the time it takes." This epic of liberation from captivity — through vision, determination, trust, and agreement to obey God's law — is a radical alternative to fatalistic thinking, to believing that the way things are is necessarily how they must continue to be. The biblical account of the Exodus made linear time, rather than cyclical time, a foundational metaphor for the West, and hence for any society influenced by the cultures of the West. Implicit in it is the concept of progress: human beings are able to free themselves, to learn, to achieve enlightenment. The road metaphor is kept but its meaning changed(20-1)
The second lecture, 'Fate and Furies' redeems the book. It is simply brilliant but not as good as the third lecture, 'Free Fall.' Visser articulates the difference between shame and guilt and why knowing the difference is important. Shame is conferred onto the person by the society — it requires an audience. Guilt, on the other hand, is felt by the individual, and is invisible to the society. This is important, Visser argues, because shame demands a revenge in order to recover the lost honour, whereas guilt demands self knowledge and repentance. It also allows for, but does not demand, forgiveness. The former binds the person to his or her fate, whereas the latter allows for the individual to change and grow. Guilt, repentance and forgiveness empowers the individual to move beyond his/her own failings and to redeem his or herself, i.e. to grow, independently of how the society sees that person. Fate does not allow for that, and Visser effectively argues that we are societally reverting to fate language, fateful thinking, and feelings of being imprisoned by forces beyond our abilities.

From 'Fate and Furies:'

An honour system is communal, close, warm — even fiery. It insists on selfless loyalty to all those defined as being one's own. Individualism, on the other hand, can often feel cold and lonely. It seems at times to undermine every attempt at community. In an individualistic society, the very same diagram as that of the jigsaw we referred to earlier lies behind many metaphors for social patterning. Only here what is being said by the diagram tends to be that each area, each life, is complete in itself, separated from all the others, responsible for itself. Impingement upon others is discouraged, and the invasion of one's own privacy is experienced as an outrage. The image is like the one we looked at earlier, of a table set for dinner. Or a demand that others — especially strangers, of course — should not nudge or pat me too often, or stand too close while speaking to me, or sit down right next to me when I was hoping to be all alone on the beach. Individualism tends not only to protect but to isolate; it can trap people behind the walls that separate each person from every other.

What individualism demands — just as the whole point of guilt is the possibility of forgiveness that it offers — is for people to feel safe enough, ready and willing and free enough, to open up those protective barriers in order to notice, take care of, and finally love other people, even those not felt to be immediately rewarding or appealing. The outstanding characteristic of Christianity is its placing the highest value of all on love, not only for one's family or group, but for everyone — including people who do things like chew with their mouths open. This insistence that love is greater than all the other virtues was, in the context of classical culture at the time of Christianity's beginnings, a revolutionary notion, since it appeared to downplay bravery, loyalty, honesty, obedience, dignity, and all the other ideals of ancient Rome. One of the social or structural reasons for the Christian insistence on love was the immense push that the new religion simultaneously gave to individualism. Without the transcendence love provides, individualism becomes a prison. Individualism requires transcendence so that the "walls," so wisely and carefully raised in order to shelter the individual from incursions by others, can remain — but be surmountable, for higher ends (49-50).
I highly recommend this book, even though the first lecture is a tad hard to get through. Her concerns about a strong return to fatalism is I think, well founded and well argued.

Near the end of the book, she astutely links 'boredom' with exacerbating fatalistic thinking and actions. And she proffers an antidote to the drift towards powerlessness! And no, not just affirming mantras of power and adequacy:

Escape from fatalism and its twin warders, boredom and embarrassment, begins simply with consciousness — with paying attention. To be disinterested — that is, to be interested in things in and for themselves, and not because of possible profits for yourself — and especially to pay attention to what is supposed to be boring or taken for granted, is to begin to effect a minor revolution, another word for which is 'conversion.' Notice immediately that paying attention is an action: we are free to do it — or to turn away(143).
She elaborates three other actions and another state of mind as tools to combat fatalism in thought and action. (But I find it very evocative that her first action is what Cesar Milan tries to teach his dog owners: to be fully aware of their actions and their dogs real needs.)

Friday, June 17, 2011

2011.06.17 — The Year of the Flood by Margaret Atwood: Finished

Margaret Atwood.
The Year of the Flood.
UK: Virago Press (Little, Brown Book Group), 2010.
ISBN: 1844085643.

☆☆☆☆☆ out of ☆☆☆☆☆.

TYotF is an excellent companion to Oryx and Crake. Actually, it was so good that I finished the book before I had time to create my 'begun reading' blog.

At a high level, it was fun to see how, and how effectively, Atwood played with the characters crossing between the two books. At a more subtle level, how Atwood dexterously extended and deepened the shallowness of the pleeb world was extremely funny, very sad, and disturbingly reflective.

This world resonated with me more than that of O&C's, including the characters. In part because it is more close to the world that I see around me including the seeds of her descriptive dystopia. I found Atwood's slightly exagerated characterization of the lunatics and their groups to be on point and very real. The Gardener's Hymn book was a source of aeternal delight because it was both satirical and true at the same time.

Also the product names and uses, the social past times and entertainments, all delightfully echoed our marketed world. And at the same time Atwood somehow managed to pay a delightful homage to the world described by Orwell in 1984, while taking it along its own self-consistent path.

I think that the characters were more finely drawn in TYotF, and not just the females. Adam One and Zeb began flat, but this was perfectly described as if through the eyes of the resourceful, ever sceptical Toby. And as Toby grew the men became characters and not caricatures.
Atwood's characterizations are powerfully, simply done. For example, the vanity of Ren's mother is delightful described by a daughter with a wisdom that is beyond her years and not quite grounded, but is at the same time told as if by someone still innocent as they would be after having lived in the Gardener's hippy-like commune:
'What are you doing in the closet, darling?' said Lucerne [Ren's mother]. 'Come and have some lunch! You'll feell better soon!' She sounded chirpy: the crazier and more disturbed I acted, the better it was for her, because the less anyone would believe me if I told on her.

Her story was that I'd been traumatized by being stuck in among the warped, brainwashing cult folk. I had no way of proving her wrong. Anyway maybe I had been traumatized: I had nothing to compare myself with (252-3).
Atwood's use of voice in the book is interesting. The young girl who becomes a women in the story, Ren, is told in the first person present. Toby, who begins as a young women is told in third person past. I'm not sure why this worked, but it did. I've thought about it, and I think it worked because Atwood was emphasizing the voice of the innocent child with an unconscious wisdom as being alive in the immediate present. Whereas Toby felt dislocated and outside of her existence throughout the book. I've given a small example of Ren abve, and now for Toby's character. Atwood's description is masterful, and takes the entire book. I'll begin with Ren's childhood description:
... The Gardener kids had nicknames for all of the teachers. Pilar was the Fungus, Zeb was the Mad Adam, Stuart was the Screw because he built furniture. Mugi was the Muscle, Manushka was the Mucous, Rebecca was the Salt and Peppler, Burt was the Knob because he was bald. Toby was the Dry Witch. Witch because she was always mixing things up and pouring them into bottles and Dry because she was so thin and hard, and to tell her apart from Nuala, who was the Wet Witch because of her damp mouth and her wobbly bum, and because you could make her cry so easily.
...
We could never make the Dry Witch Toby cry. The boys said she was a hardass — she and Rebecca were the two hardest asses. Rebecca was jolly on the outside, but you did not push her buttons. As for Toby, she was leathery inside and out. 'Don't try it Shackleton,' she would say, even though her back was turned. Nuala was too kind to us, but Toby held us to account, and we trusted Toby more: you'd trust a rock more than a cake (74-5).
Now, here's Toby through her own, 3rd person eyes:
Gradually, Toby stopped thinking that she should leave the Gardeners. She didn't really believe in their creed, but she no longer disbelieved. One season blended into the next — rainy, stormy, hot and dry, cooler and dry, rainy and warm — and then one year into another. She wasn't quite a Gardener, yet she wasn't a pleeblander any more. She was neither the one nor the other (116).
And, finally:
How old will I be, thought Toby, before I can be that calm? She felt cut open (127).
Toby's ambivalence was perfeclty described, and made the Gordener's ostensible silliness both more real and more endearing. This was no small feat of writing!

I won't say that this book is better than O&C, but rather that reading both books elevates them above what they are if read singly. I am strongly tempted, now, to re-read O&C to seek out the extended subtle overlaps between the two.

Thursday, May 26, 2011

2011.05.26 — Beyond Fate by Margaret Visser: Begun


Margaret Visser.
Beyond Fate,
Toronto: House of Anansi Press Inc.
ISBN 0887846793

This book has begun in a good, but not great manner. I thoroughly enjoyed Visser's Much Depends On Dinner and The Gift of Thanks. What I'm finding is that the text in this book is too literally a transcription of the oral lectures from which it derives. Visser's manner of oral presentation does not transcribe well to the written word. Briefly, so far — 20 pages — it strikes me that it would benefit from some editing.

Visser - Photo with Permission from John MacDonald
Nevertheless, Visser's argument and ideas are interesting and challenging. For example, she begins with by looking at "time-lines" with an examination of how our language predicates (is predicated by?) the notion of a beginning, middle and end with no going backwards. She makes an interesting link to how our pictorial methods of representing time, such as a line, also create straight and narrow thinking, a rigidity when it comes to accepting too easily what is perhaps something not really fated but that is instead an opportunity to exercise personal creativity in overcoming an ostensible destiny.

Here's a short extract showing the role the Greeks had in linking fate to geometry:
Ancient Greeks thought a great deal about fate, and when they did, the metaphors they used to think with were often spatial, indeed geometrical. The Greeks were obsessed with geometry. Among the first traces of them that we possess are their pots in the style called Geometric, after its most obvious characteristic, the geometrical patterns drawn on the curved clay surfaces.
Several hundred years later, by which time Greek thinkers — leaning heavily upon mathematical interpretations of religious ideas and religious interpretations of mathematics — had permanently altered the intellectual history of the world, we find Plato writing over the gateway to his Academy, "Let no one enter here who does not know geometry." Fate, for them, was a spatial and diagrammatic idea from the beginning. It was a gigantic blueprint, a "design" laid out in advance. A tendency to lean on linear metaphors continues both to inspire and to haunt our imaginations today. We need think only of the signs of the zodiac and their interpretation in astrology, or of palmistry, the reading of people's characters and fates from the lines on the palms of their hands. Geometrical metaphors in general can predispose us, when we are being careless, to cage up our vision and fail to let go of fatalism. I'll be giving in the course of this book lots of modern examples of the fatal diagram.

In traditional poetry, a person's life has often been imagined as a line representing time: a thread spun by the gods, by fate, or by the three Fates. In Greek, the names of these relentless mythical crones were Clotho (Spinner), Lachesis (Allotment), and Atropos (Not to be Turned Aside). They indicated past, present, and future: the past as already spun and purely linear; the present an intersection, station, or point marked out upon the line; the future as what you think you can control but cannot, Roman, Scandinavian, and Germanic mythologies also knew three Fates. They spun or braided the ropes of events in world history. They also made individual fates for human beings, in parallel with a life, the thread starting at its beginning and being snipped off when the time came to die. Or the fate was complete from the beginning, and it remained only for the person to travel his or her allotted span, the "road" of life. The three witches in Macbeth are versions of the Fates.
deviantart 3 witches
Shakespeare, however, insists on his characters' free will: the riddling fiends mislead, but they never force decisions.

What the myths of fate express is the sense we all have at times that we are not in charge; that events, rules, and systems act upon us, or make us act, in ways not of our choosing. It is entirely right that we should realize this, but we have to discriminate between what is in fact changeable and what is not. The diagram metaphor — its very clarity, its self-evidence — leans heavily on the side of inalterability, of the hopelessness of change (11-2 my emphasis).
We'll see how it goes.

It is interesting to me, in a way, to pick this book up while reading Chomsky. He is fighting to wake up American's to their not being fated to ignorance and manufactured consent for brutal hegemony.

And I'm reminded of something Linda McQuaig said in an interview or panel discussion many years ago.
Paraphrased she pointed out that when it comes to fighting inflation, the press argue that we are powerful and will win the fight by tightening our belts, reducing our expectations and accepting diminished social benefits in our brave struggle against succumbing to the ignoble fate of bankruptcy. She added that when it comes to issues of reduced corporate taxation, unemployment and the social costs of free trade and 'globalization,' however, they become flaccid apologists who vociferously argue that we are helpless to these 'natural' economic forces and to accept them as it is our fate.

Tuesday, May 17, 2011

2011.05.15 — Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media by Edward S. Herman & Noam Chomsky: Begun 2011.04.25


Edward S. Herman & Noam Chomsky.
Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media.
New York. Pantheon Books, 2002.
Pages: 480. ISBN: 978-0-375-71449-8.

[The above is to the currently available edition. The edition I'm citing from — pictured left — is the 1988 edition, 412 pages: ISBN 0-679-72034-0.]


I'm barely into the book — around page 65 — and already it has shown itself to be extremely interesting and important. So much so that I'd like to post several passages from it now. From the preface:

... the democratic postulate is that the media are independent and committed to discovering and reporting the truth, and that they do not merely reflect the world as powerful groups wish it to be perceived. Leaders of the media claim that their news choices rest on unbiased professional and objective criteria, and they have support for this contention in the intellectual community. If, however, the powerful are able to fix the premises of discourse, to decide what the general populace is allowed to see, hear, and think about, and to "manage" public opinion by regular propaganda campaigns, the standard view of how the system works is at serious odds with reality.

The special importance of propaganda in what Walter Lippmann referred to as the "manufacture of consent" has long been recognized by writers on public opinion, propaganda, and the political requirements of social order.
Lippmann himself, writing in the early 1920s, claimed that propaganda had already become "a regular organ of popular government," and was steadily increasing in sophistication and importance. We do not contend that this is all the mass media do, but we believe the propaganda function to be a very important aspect of their overall service (p.xi my emphasis).
And these opening paragraphs set the tone for H&C's calm, detailed and dispassionate examination of both the truthfulness and quality of popular corporate news. Even if you think that H&C are wrong, this opening premise is not justifiably dismissed before examining the careful arguments and detailed evidence that comprise this book.

Because they are presenting the antithetical idea that the free media in America, the land of free, is not really 'free,' H&C have indeed proceeded carefully, with detail and detailed references. That some of the right-leaning ideologues dismiss their argument solely with epithets and rah-rah America is effective proof that they haven't read it — or if they have, further evidence that there is no breadth of untruth that delusion cannot span nor propaganda fail to deify.

I was particularly bemused by H&C's effort to pre-empt standard 'conspiracy theory' arguments that are still being leveled against them.
Institutional critiques such as we present in this book are commonly dismissed by establishment commentators as "conspiracy theories," but this is merely an evasion. We do not use any kind of "conspiracy" hypothesis to explain mass-media performance. In fact, our treatment is much closer to a "free market" analysis, with the results largely an outcome of the workings of market forces. Most biased choices in the media arise from the pre-selection of right-thinking people, internalized preconceptions, and the adaptation of personnel to the constraints of ownership, organization, market, and political power. Censorship is largely self-censorship, by reporters and commentators who adjust to the realities of source and media organizational requirements, and by people at higher levels within media organizations who are chosen to implement, and have usually internalized, the constraints imposed by proprietary and other market and governmental centers of power (p.xii).
And so far, in what I've read, they haven't proposed a 'conspiracy' as such, but more a confluence of like actions by like people predicated on common principles of capital ownership and the expansion and consolidation of American-based economic power and world hegemony.

And in principle this is an argument that is neither unreasonable nor ideological. The owners of the media are relatively small in number, which is well detailed in Manufacturing Consent. Furthermore, the owners are generally guided by quite narrow and institutional financial demands, the influence of government regulation and advertising revenues, and personal gains in remuneration and social prestige. For these reasons alone, not withstanding a degree of democratic capitalistic ideology, it is not unreasonable to see how the owners of the media, and in turn those whom they pay, will be at least tempted to de-emphasize certain stories and emphasize others from time to time.

Now, it is possible that the ambitious may turn away from the financial and career costs of biting the hands that feed them. But the record of the powerful in history, let alone pragmatic honesty with regards to human nature when faced with wealth or penury, would bely that: greed and ambition are far more stupefying and corrupting than sex ever has been. (E.G. The Golden Goose,
Midas Touch, The Emporer's New Clothes, all attest to the archetypal presence of greed's ability to easily stupefy and for power to facilitate delusion.)

With an honest eye open to the record of human corruption with, by and for the powerful, one would expect that, in a reasonable world, it would be the role of the ideological right to prove that those who are running the country's media and purse strings are keeping to the straight and narrow. However, what we ignorant masses get instead are knee-jerk dismissals and epithets, even after the recent criminal banking practices and multi-mulit-billion dollar payoffs. Perhaps that reality is the true testament to the effectiveness of America's 'democratic' propaganda machine.

And, as if to confirm this argument, a Google search directed me to an interesting talk given by Chomsky following the publication of Manufacturing Consent . In it, paraphrased, he relates his personal experience with the power of media ownership to shred free speech and, worst of all, to stand by while it is done and remain mute. And by that silence rests democracy's quietus, for the media have by their inaction disavowed themselves from integrity, honesty and, worst of all, their responsibility to defend against such attacks on the basis of plain and simple human decency.


March 15, 1989       Noam Chomsky Manufacturing Consent: A Talk Recorded at the Memorial Union Theater on the University of Wisconsin campus in Madison, Wisconsin.

Let me begin with two recent events, both of them widely publicized. The first has to do with the famous Salman Rushdie case. A couple of days ago you may have noticed that the prime minister of Iran suggested a very simple way to resolve the crisis concerning Rushdie. He suggested that what should happen is that all the copies of his book Satanic Verses should simply be burned. And I guess the implication is that if that happened then they could cancel the death sentence. That's one case — lots of [media] coverage. Second case had something to do with an interesting thing that happened here. There was what some people are calling a mega-merger, of two media giants.
Walter Lippman Sep 27, 1937
Time Incorporated and Warner Communications Incorporated. Each of them huge conglomorants, and coming together they've formed, apparently, the world's biggest media empire. Now that also had a lot of publicity, even outside the business pages. And there was concern over the effects of the merger by increasing media concentration so effectively — the effects on freedom of expression.

Well these two events, they seem rather remote from one another. And in a sense they are. But we can draw them together by recalling an event which was not considered important enough to be reported. But which I happen to know about because I was personally involved. The title for this talk is, you may have noticed, "Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media." That's actually the title of a recent book I was co-author of with — my co-author was Edward Herman. And the two of us have been working together for many years. Our first book was published in 1974, a book on American foreign policy and the media, in fact. And it was published by a ... flourishing text book publisher, which happened to be a subsidiary of Warner Communications Incorporated.

Well, unless you are a very rare person you never saw that book. And the reason was that when the advertising for the book appeared, after 20, 000 copies were published, one of the executives of Warner Communications saw the advertising and didn't like the feel of it and asked to see the book, and liked it even less. In fact, was appalled. And then followed an interaction which I won't bother describing. But the end result of it was that the parent company, Warner Communication, simply decided to put the publisher out of business, and to end the whole story that way. Now they didn't burn the books, they pulped them. Which is more civilized — and also books don't burn very well, actually, I'm told. They're kind of like bricks. [Some laughter.] But pulping works. And it wasn't just our book that was eliminated, it was all the books published by that publisher.

Well, there are a couple of differences between this and the case of the Prime Minister of Iran. One difference is that this was actually done, not just suggested. [Applause.] The second difference is that it wasn't just one book, it was all books which happened to be tainted by being published by the publisher who had done this bad thing. A third difference is the reaction. The reaction in the case of the Warner Communications putting a publisher out of business to prevent them from publishing our book — the reaction to that was zero. Not because it wasn't known, it was just not considered to be of any significance. Whereas the Rushdie affair, of course, has had a huge furor, as it should. And the prime minister's proposal was greeted with ridicule and contempt, as a demonstration of what you could expect from these barbarous people. So there are some differences (2'08"-6'20").
For the complete talk, go to Manufacturing Consent.

Addendum 2011.05.20
I tried to be lazy with this post by omitting the text's notes. However, it didn't feel right reading Chomsky without reading also his endless, invaluable references. So, without the footnote numbering within the text, here are the footnotes — please consider them to be a kind of reference bibleography. And I have been unable not to include links to various references, bios, etc.

Preface Notes pages x-xiv

1. We use the term "special interests" in its commonsense meaning, not in the Orwellian usage of the Reagan era, where it designates workers, farmers, women, youth, blacks, the aged and infirm, the unemployed—in short, the population at large. Only one group did not merit this appellation: orporations, and their owners and managers. They are not "special interests," they represent the "national interest." This terminology represents the reality of domination and the operational usage of "national interest" for the two major political parties. For a similar view, with evidence of the relevance of this usage to both major political parties, see Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, Right Turn: The Decline of the Democrats and the Future of American Politics (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), pp. 37-39 and passim.
2. Herbert Gans, for example, states that "The beliefs that actually make it into the news are professional values that are intrinsic to national journalism and that journalists learn on the job.. .. The rules of news judgment call for ignoring story implications ..." ("Are U.S. Journalists Dangerously Liberal?" Columbia Journalism Review [Nov.-Dec. 1985], pp. 32-33). In his book Deciding What's News, (New York: Vintage [Out of Print], 1980), Gans contends that media reporters are by and large "objective," but within a framework of beliefs in a set of "enduring values" that include "ethnocentrism" and "responsible capitalism," among others. We would submit that if reporters for Pravda were found to operate within the constraints of belief in the essential justice of the Soviet state and "responsible communism," this would be found to make any further discussion of "objectivity" pointless. Furthermore, as we shall document below, Gans greatly understates the extent to which media reporters work within a limiting framework of assumptions.
3. Neoconservative critiques of the mass media commonly portray them as bastions of liberal, antiestablishment attacks on the system. They ignore the fact that the mass media are large business corporations controlled by very wealthy individuals or other corporations, and that the members of what the neoconservatives describe as the "liberal culture" of the media are hired employees. They also disregard the fact that the members of this liberal culture generally accept the basic premises of the system and differ with other members of the establishment largely on the tactics appropriate to achieving common ends. The neoconservatives are simply not prepared to allow deviations from their own views. In our analysis in chapter i, we describe them as playing the important role of "enforcers," attempting to browbeat the media into excluding from a hearing even the limited dissent now tolerated. For an analysis of the neoconservative view of the media, see Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, "Ledeen on the Media," in The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection (New York: Sheridan Square Publications, 1986), pp. 166-70; George Gerbner, "Television: The Mainstreaming of America," in Business and the Media, Conference Report, Yankelovich, Skelly and White, November 19, 1981; Gans, "Are U.S. Journalists Dangerously Liberal?" [I couldn't find a link to that article, but found this instead: "The Illeberal Media" by Edward s. Herman.]
4. See Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (1921; reprint, London: Alien & Unwin, 1932); Harold Lasswell, "Propaganda," in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1933); Edward Bemays, Propaganda (New York: H. Liveright, 1928); M. J. Crozier, S. P. Huntington, and J. Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Govemability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press, 1975). For further discussion, see Noam Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War (New York: Pantheon [out of print], 1982), chapter I. and references cited, particularly, Alex Carey, "Reshaping the Truth: Pragmatists and Propagandists in America," Meanjin Quarterly (Australia), vol. 35, no. 4 (1976).
5. Public Opinion, p. 248. Lippmann did not find this objectionable, as "the common interests very largely elude public opinion entirely, and can be managed only by a specialized class whose personal interests reach beyond the locality" (p. 310). He was distressed that the incorrigible bias of the press might mislead the "specialized class" as well as the public. The problem, therefore, was how to get adequate information to the decision-making elites (pp. 31-32). This, he believed, might be accomplished by development of a body of independent experts who could give the leadership unbiased advice. Lippmann raised no question about possible personal or class interests of the "specialized class" or the "experts" on whom they might choose to rely, on their ability, or their right, to articulate "the common interest."
6. For example, Claire Sterling and the experts of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies—Walter Laqueur, Michael Ledeen, and Robert Kupperman—have been established as the authorities on terrorism by the mass media; on the Sterling and Paul Henze role in working up the Bulgarian Connection in the plot against the pope, see chapter 4. In the case of Latin America, the media have been compelled to avoid the usual resort to the academic profession for expression of approved opinion, as the profession largely rejects the framework of state propaganda in this instance. It has therefore been necessary to create a new cadre of "experts" (Robert Leiken, Ronald Radosh, Mark Falcon", Susan Kaufman Purcell, etc.) to whom they can turn to satisfy doctrinal needs. See Noam Chomsky, The Culture of Terrorism (Boston: South End Press, 1988), for examples. On the process of creating experts to meet system demands, see our chapter i under "Sourcing MassMedia News."
7. Like other terms of political discourse, the word "democracy" has a technical Orwellian sense when used in rhetorical nights, or in regular "news reporting," to refer to U.S. efforts to establish "democracy." The term refers to systems in which control over resources and the means of violence ensures the rule of elements that will serve the needs of U.S. power. Thus the terror states of El Salvador and Guatemala are "democratic," as is Honduras under the rule of the military and oligarchy, and the collection of wealthy businessmen, bankers, etc., organized by the United States as a front for the Somocista-led mercenary army created by the United States is entitled "the democratic resistance." See further, chapter 3.
8. In the eighty-five opinion columns on Nicaragua that appeared in the New York Times and the Washington Post in the first three months of 1986, during the "national debate" preceding the congressional votes on contra aid, not a single one mentioned this elementary fact. For a detailed review, see Noam Chomsky, "Introduction," in Morris Morley and James Petras, The Reagan Administration and Nicaragua, Monograph I (New York: Institute for Media Analysis, 1987).
9. Only two phrases in the eighty-five opinion columns cited in the previous footnote mentioned that the Nicaraguan government had carried out reforms; none of them compared Nicaragua with El Salvador and Guatemala on this important question.
10. See Dianna Melrose, Nicaragua: The Threat of a Good Example? (Oxford: Oxfam, 1985); see also chapters 3, 5, and 7, below. n. In an article highly critical of the Reagan "peace plan" for Nicaragua in August 1987, Tom Wicker says, "Whatever his doctrine, the United States has no historic or God-given right to bring democracy to other nations; nor does such a purpose justify the overthrow of governments it does not like" ("That Dog Won't Hunt," New York Times, Aug. 6, 1987). Wicker does not contest the claim that Reagan seeks democracy in Nicaragua; it is just that his means are dubious and his plan won't work. We should note that Wicker is at the outer limits of expressible dissident opinion in the U.S. mass media. See further, chapter 3. For additional references and discussion, see Chomsky, Culture of Terrorism.
12. For example, in response to the Guatemala peace accords of August 1987, the United States immediately escalated the supply flights required to keep its forces in Nicaragua in the field to the phenomenal level of two to three per day. The purpose was to undermine the accords by intensifying the fighting, and to prevent Nicaragua from relaxing its guard so that it could be accused of failing to comply with the accords. These U.S. initiatives were by far the most serious violations of the accords, but they were virtually unmentioned in the media. For a detailed review, see Noam Chomsky, "Is Peace at Hand?" Z magazine (January 1988).
13. Jacques Ellul, Propaganda (New York: Knopf, 1965), pp. 58-59.
14. A careful reader of the Soviet press could learn facts about the war in Afghanistan that controvert the government line—see chapter 5, pp. 226-27—but these inconvenient facts would not be considered in the West to demonstrate the objectivity of the Soviet press and the adequacy of its coverage of this issue (331-4).

Saturday, May 14, 2011

2011.05.14 — Beatrice & Virgil Finished 2011.05.05


☆☆☆☆☆ out of ☆☆☆☆☆.
Finished 2011.05.05. Begun 2011.05.01.

Yann Martel.
Beatrice & Virgil.
Toronto: Random House, 2010.
ISBN 9780307398772.

I was originally tempted to give this four ☆s because the ending just didn't ring true to the story told. (I'm not sure how the ending could be improved, however.) But the book has gripped my intestines and rattled my imagination so much so that since finishing it nine days ago, I'm still struggling to put into words the complexity and beauty and shear power of this story. (I will blog that extended reaction soon — I hope.)

There are passages in the book with prose as beautiful as anything I've ever read. For example:

BEATRICE: As for the other quality that gives Virgil his name, how to put into words something so astounding to the ears? Words are cold, muddy toads trying to understand sprites dancing in a field—but they're all we have. I will try.

A howl, a roar, a howling roar, a deafening roar— these barely hint at the reality. To compare it to other animals' cries becomes a kind of zoological one-upmanship that addresses only the aspect of volume. A howler monkey's roar exceeds in volume the cry of a peafowl, of a jaguar, of a lion, of a gorilla, of an elephant—at which point the inflating of hulk stops, at least on land. In the ocean, the blue whale, which can weigh well over one hundred and fifty tons, the largest animal ever to grace this planet, can put out a cry at a volume of one hundred and eighty decibels, which is louder than a jet engine, but this cry is at a very low frequency, hardly audible to a donkey, which is probably why we call the whale's cry a song. But we must, in all fairness, grant the blue whale top spot. So there, if they were lined up side by side, between the massive bull elephant and the colossal blue whale, involving a serious dropping of the eyes, stands Virgil and his kind, without a doubt the most noise per kilo of any life-form on earth (88-9).
Scene from LoP
At my prompt my friend RT — a huge fan of Life of Pi — read the book, albeit with some hesitation because I'd warned her that there are some brutal bits. When she finished it she thanked me and said that it has become her number one favourite book. She told me she was going out the next day to buy her own copy so as to read it again. My other friend, TR — a voracious reader — also read it at my prompting, and thought it great too. And I just finished talking with AG, the friend who prompted me to read it, and she too found it impressive and complex and challenging, and tough.

Since I loved Life of Pi I was skeptical that Martel could surpass it. I would have been overjoyed if he could even have matched it. But to my shock, Beatrice and Virgil is a better book than LoP for many reasons: B&V was a far tougher story to tell, and it was told very well; it followed a brilliant book; Martel used animals again, but kept it new and fresh; he successfully explored the limits of text to express emotion in a multilayered, contra textual way about an emotionally, psychologically and historically sensitive subject.

I cannot recommend this book highly enough.